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abstract: Feeding in groups often gives rise to joining: feeding
from other’s discoveries. The joining decision has been modeled as
a producer-scrounger game where the producer strategy consists of
searching for one’s food and the scrounger strategy consists of search-
ing for food discovered by others. Previous models revealed that the
evolutionarily stable proportion of scrounging mostly depends on
the fraction of each food patch available only to its producer. These
early models are static and state independent and are therefore unable
to explore whether the time of day, the animal’s state, and the degree
of predation hazard influence an individual’s decision of whether to
use the producer or scrounger strategy. To investigate these issues,
we developed a state-dependent dynamic producer-scrounger game
model. The model predicts that, early in the day, low reserves pro-
mote a preference for the scrounger strategy, while the same con-
dition late in the day favors the use of the producer strategy. Under
rich and clumped food, the availability of scrounging can improve
the daily survival of any average group member. The model suggests
only weak effects of predation hazard on the use of scrounging.
Future developments should consider the effects of dominance asym-
metries and allowing foragers a choice between foraging alone or in
a group harboring an evolutionarily stable frequency of scrounger.
Keywords: social foraging, producer-scrounger game, state-dependent
dynamic game.
Most animals’ behavior follows a more or less regular daily
pattern (routine). Recent theoretical investigations of
* E-mail: zbarta@dragon.klte.hu.
† E-mail: giraluc@vax2.concordia.ca.
Am. Nat. 2000. Vol. 155, pp. 570–582. q 2000 by The University of Chicago.
0003-0147/2000/15504-0011$03.00. All rights reserved.
state-dependent dynamic models (reviewed by Cuthill and
Houston 1997; Houston and McNamara 1999) identify
several innately associated trade-offs among the day-night
cycle, gaining/consuming energy and avoiding predation,
which can generate these routines even in the absence of
varying external variables (e.g., food availability or tem-
perature). Night (the nonforaging period), for instance,
notably reduces the animal’s energy reserves, which can
only be replenished during daylight. Foraging increases
energy reserves at the expense of increased predation haz-
ard, while resting offers more safety against predators but
consumes energy (Houston et al. 1993). As a consequence
of these trade-offs, different behavioral actions are optimal
during different parts of the day, leading to the emergence
of daily routines. As a result of recent theoretical and
empirical investigations (e.g., McNamara et al. 1994; Wit-
ter et al. 1994; Cuthill and Houston 1997; Dall and Witter
1998; Houston and McNamara 1999; Van der Veen, in
press a, in press b), a lot is known both about the solitary
animals’ daily routines and about the factors influencing
them but the analysis of daily routines of animals taking
part in social foraging interactions is still missing.
The exploitation of companions’ search effort is one of
the most common forms of social-foraging interactions
that occur both within (Giraldeau and Beauchamp 1999)
and between species (Sibly 1984; Barnard and Thompson
1985). In ground-feeding passerines, for instance, some
individuals actively search for food patches while others
appear to wait for them to find a patch, rushing in to
secure a share when they do (Barnard and Sibly 1981;
Giraldeau et al. 1994).
In order to account for the coexistence of feeding both
through finding and joining within a single-species group,
the phenomenon has been modeled as a static, alternative-
option, n-person evolutionary game (Barnard and Sibly
1981; Maynard Smith 1982; Parker 1984). The game as-
sumes that individuals have access to two mutually exclu-
sive foraging strategies: producer, which consists of search-
ing for food, or scrounger, which consists of searching for
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individuals that have found food. Individuals can be pure
producer, pure scrounger, or, more commonly, they can
alternate between strategies. It is important to keep in
mind, however, that individuals that alternate can only use
one or the other strategy at any one time (Giraldeau and
Beauchamp 1999). When scrounging is rare in the group,
the scrounger strategy is assumed to do better than its
producer alternative because it can take advantage of the
many exploitable food patches that are made available by
the numerous individuals engaged in the producer strat-
egy. However, the reverse holds when scrounging becomes
common; now the number of available food patches de-
creases as a consequence of the decreasing number of in-
dividuals in the producer strategy while at the same time
the number of individuals competing within the scrounger
strategy is greater (Barnard and Sibly 1981). In a symmetric
game involving phenotypically equivalent players, this
strong negative frequency dependence often leads to an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that contains both for-
aging options occurring at a frequency where payoffs ob-
tained by each are equal: a mixed ESS (Maynard Smith
1982; Parker 1984). Using this game-theoretic framework,
a number of producer-scrounger foraging models, whether
based on food intake maximization (Vickery et al. 1991;
Ranta et al. 1996) or starvation risk minimization (Caraco
and Giraldeau 1991), have concluded that the equilibrium
frequency of scrounger within any group depends strongly
on the fraction of each food patch available only to its
producer, that is, the finder’s share and the group size.
Increasing the finder’s share leads to a decreasing equilib-
rium proportion of scroungers by decreasing the scroung-
ers’ gain from a patch. On the other hand, increasing group
size raises the stable proportion of individuals in the
scrounger strategy because larger groups mean a greater
number of exploitable individuals in the producer strategy.
Some empirical studies (e.g., Giraldeau et al. 1990, 1994;
Koops and Giraldeau 1996) support the previous pro-
ducer-scrounger models’ predictions. The qualitative suc-
cesses of these static models suggest that a dynamic, state-
dependent version would be useful in exploring the
conditions under which we expect optimal daily routines
of producer and scrounger use. Consequently, we develop
here a state-dependent dynamic producer-scrounger game.
The state-dependent dynamic game approach compares
different actions through a common currency: survival in
our case (McNamara and Houston 1986). This common
currency allows us to ask how the use of scrounging can
influence the individuals’ survival probability as well as
explore any potential effects of other nonforaging con-
straints, such as predation hazards. As a consequence, a
dynamic model can shed light on the role of the scrounger
strategy in the dynamics of populations (McNamara and
Houston 1987).
The Model
We considered small seed-eating birds surviving several
winter days and nights. During the day, the birds can
choose to rest or to forage, in which case they can choose
to play either producer or scrounger. During the night, all
birds rest. The birds’ energy reserves decline as the result
of the metabolic cost. To survive the night, the birds need
a large, sometimes randomly fluctuating energy reserve. A
bird can be captured by a predator only while it forages.
Predation hazard is mass dependent and increases with a
bird’s energy reserves (Witter and Cuthill 1993; Witter et
al. 1994). The birds must therefore keep their reserves at
a reasonable level (for details of the model, see the ap-
pendix; McNamara et al. 1994).
The birds’ energy reserves can increase only through
foraging activity. We assume that the birds always feed in
a flock of N individuals. This means that, considering a
large population, a bird is always able to find a foraging
group of size in which to forage, independently ofN 2 1
the proportion of resting birds in the population; that is,
resting birds are not considered to be part of the foraging
flock. This would be a reasonable assumption in the case
of a large bird population living and resting at a focal
point (e.g., communal roost) surrounded by fields where
they feed in small flocks. Foraging involves the use of either
producer or scrounger for the duration of the time inter-
val. So, the proportion of scroungers (pS) remains constant
during an interval. The number of scroungers (NS) in the
flock is NpS, while the number of producers (NP) is
.N(1 2 p )S
We presume that producers search for food indepen-
dently of each other and a producer can only feed from
patches it uncovers itself. Scroungers, instead, can only
feed from patches uncovered by producers. We also assume
that patch exploitation time is negligible compared to
search time and that individuals are competitively equal.
It follows that all scroungers in the flock (NS) obtain the
same share of each discovered patch and that each of the
producers’ patch findings are detected by all those playing
scrounger. Upon finding a patch, a producer first con-
sumes some food while alone (the finder’s advantage, a;
Vickery et al. 1991) and then shares the remainder food
with the arriving scroungers. The finder’s share (FS) is
defined as the proportion of food consumed by the pro-
ducer to the total amount of food in the patch. The FS
may depend on the handling time of a food item (the
larger the handling time, the smaller the FS) or on the
average distance of foragers in the flock (the larger the
distance, the larger the FS). In the model, we consider the
FS as an ecological constraint over which the foragers have
no control (for further details, see the appendix).
When there is more than one individual playing pro-
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Figure 1: Probability distribution of energetic gain of producers and
scroungers during an interval. (NP = 3; NS = 2; other parameters as
baseline).
Figure 2: Effect of d (the extent of error; McNamara et al. 1997) on the
trajectories of reserves along the day (baseline except FS = 1.0).
ducer in the group, the probability of eating nothing dur-
ing an interval is higher for individuals in the producer
strategy than those in the scrounger (fig. 1). On the other
hand, the producer has a higher chance of obtaining large
amounts of food because, when , a producer alwaysFS 1 0
gains more from a patch than the scroungers (fig. 1). On
the basis of these properties, the producer is said to be
risk prone, while the scrounger is risk averse (Caraco and
Giraldeau 1991; Koops and Giraldeau 1996).
A policy is a decision rule that specifies which action
to choose as a function of time of day and energy reserves
(Houston and McNamara 1988b). State-dependent opti-
mal policies are usually found by dynamic programming
(McNamara and Houston 1986; Houston et al. 1988; Man-
gel and Clark 1988), but in the case of producer-scrounger
games, we could not proceed this way because an indi-
vidual’s gain is frequency dependent. Specifically, an in-
dividual’s gain, here, depends on the proportion playing
scrounger. Therefore, we followed the iteration procedure
proposed by Houston and McNamara (1987, 1988a) and
modified by McNamara et al. (1997) to determine the
evolutionarily stable dynamic policy. To calculate the op-
timal policy, we used the “errors in decision making” ap-
proach (McNamara et al. 1997), which makes the biolog-
ically relevant assumption that animals may make mistakes
during the decision process. The probability of errors,
however, depends on their costs so that actions that se-
riously decrease the animal’s reproductive value compared
to the best available action are chosen very rarely, while
mistakes with trivial consequences can be made more of-
ten. So, if two actions differ only slightly in their effects
on the animal’s reproductive value, the individual will
choose them with more or less equal probability. Intro-
ducing errors in decision making eliminates most of the
problems with the above iterative method (for further de-
tails, see appendix; McNamara et al. 1997).
The key parameter of this approach is the extent of
possible error (d). When d is 0, the animals make decisions
without error, whereas increasing d means animals are
increasingly unable to differentiate actions that have sim-
ilar consequences. Preliminary calculations showed that
our foraging model was quite sensitive to the value of d
(fig. 2), so we chose the smallest possible value of d
(=0.001) that allowed us to find a stable policy in most
cases to minimize the effect of d.
Results
At first, we show the results for a baseline case (table 1).
The baseline is chosen so that its results represent general
patterns found across a wide range of parameter values.
After that we investigate the effects of some important
(from the point of view of social foraging) parameters of
the model by altering their values one at a time.
The Baseline Case
The evolutionarily stable dynamic policy depends on both
the time of day and the energy reserves (fig. 3A). It is
always optimal to rest when reserves are very high, and
this is true throughout the day. In the first part of the day,
a decrease in energy reserves leads to what we call a prob-
abilistic region. In this region, as the reserves decline, the
probability of resting also declines, the likelihood of play-
ing scrounger increases while the occurrence of producer
first increases and then decreases. At reserve levels below
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Table 1: Parameters of the model
Parameter Meaning Baseline
Group:
N Group size 5
Foraging:
Y Amount of food in a patch 10.0
l Patch-finding rate per interval for producers 1.0
FS Finder’s share .35
State variable:
x(t) Energy reserves, 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ xmax. Animal dies if x = 0.
xmax Upper limit of reserves 80.0
Time:
T Length of day 30
D Number of days 5
Metabolism:
d0r Daytime resting metabolic expenditure per time interval at reserves x = 0 1.0
d2r Rate of increase of resting metabolism expenditure with reserves .000125
d0p, d0s Foraging metabolic expenditure per time interval at reserves x = 0 2.0
d2p, d2s Rate of increase of foraging metabolism expenditure with reserves .00025
mnight Mean overnight expenditure 30.0
jnight Standard deviation of overnight expenditure 3.0
Predation:
m0p, m0s Predation hazard per interval for a foraging animal at reserves x = 0 .0002
m2p, m2s Rate of increase of predation hazard with squared reserves .00001
Finding evolutionarily
stable dynamic
policy:
d Extent of error in decision making .001
rf Replacement factor .2
imax Maximal number of iterations 5,000
Dmin Iteration stops if difference between subsequent policies smaller than Dmin .00001
those generating the probabilistic region, the optimal de-
cision is to play scrounger only. The probabilistic region
occurs for low energy reserves early in the day, but as time
of day increases, it occurs at gradually increasing energy
levels, peaking some time in the afternoon. After this peak,
the optimal pattern of behavior changes. The probabilistic
range disappears so that from high to low reserves, the
optimal strategy now goes from resting, to playing
scrounger, to playing producer. In groups of birds follow-
ing the optimal policy, the daily pattern of playing
scrounger is U-shaped. The proportion of scroungers
peaks around dawn and dusk and is lowest during midday
(fig. 3B). Furthermore, the energy reserves of individuals
playing scrounger are lower than the reserves of individuals
playing producer for the first part of the day, but the
reverse is true later in the day (fig. 3C). These patterns
can be explained on the basis of differences in the risk
sensitive properties of producer and scrounger, and they
hold for wide range of parameter values.
Finder’s Share
We investigated the effect of FS by systematically varying
its value from 0 to 1, keeping all other parameters constant.
Increasing FS in our model leads to a decrease in the daily
average proportion of scrounging (fig. 4A). This decrease
is in agreement with predictions of earlier static models
(Caraco and Giraldeau 1991; Vickery et al. 1991). How-
ever, the dynamic model predicts more scroungers at larger
FS than the static rate-maximizing model.
Moreover, the FS also greatly influences the daily pattern
of stable proportion of scrounging (fig. 4B). At small FS,
the proportion of scrounger remains constant over the day.
Under this condition, the risk-sensitive properties do not
differ much for the two strategies; therefore, it makes sense
not to use them differently along the course of the day.
As the FS, and so the differences between the strategies,
increases, the daily pattern of scrounging becomes in-
creasingly U-shaped, with peak scrounger frequencies at
dawn and dusk and lower frequencies around midday,
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Figure 3: Baseline case. A, Evolutionarily stable dynamic policy that shows what action is optimal as the function of reserves and time of day. B,
Stable proportion of scroungers in the foraging group along the day. C, Mean reserves of individuals performing different behavioral action.
much as in the baseline case. As the FS approaches 1.0,
where no profitable patch sharing (i.e., use of scrounging)
is possible, the daily scrounger pattern becomes flat again
but at a very low frequency (the frequency of the scrounger
strategy remains above 0 as a consequence of the “errors
in decision making” approach that is required by our
modeling).
The FS also influences the daily foraging routines (fig.
4C). At low FS, the birds spend most of their time foraging.
As FS increases, birds narrow their declining foraging ac-
tivity to early morning and midafternoon. The decreasing
foraging activity results from the pattern of food sharing
between producer and scrounger. High FS means a low
stable proportion of scroungers, which increases the gain
of an average group member by decreasing the number
of competing individuals in a patch. As a consequence of
increased energetic gain, the individuals can spend less
time foraging during the day, and they are still able to
collect enough food to survive the night (McNamara et
al. 1994). Minimizing time spent foraging is important
because only foraging individuals can be caught by pred-
ators. As a result, the probability of daily survival increased
with FS. However, this should not always be the case, as
we see below. The effects of FS manipulation on the for-
aging activity are analogous to those of changing food
abundance in other dynamic model studies (e.g., McNa-
mara et al. 1987, 1994).
Food
We manipulate food in two ways. First, we change patch-
iness by varying both the patch-finding rate and the
amount of food in a patch so that their product (i.e., the
average gain) remains constant. Varying patchiness does
not change the average daily stable proportion of scroung-
ing. Increasing patchiness decreases the probability of sur-
vival at most values of the FS (fig. 5). This effect may come
from the increased stochasticity in food supply (McNa-
mara and Houston 1987). When food is evenly distributed
or moderately aggregated, daily survival decreases with
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Figure 4: Effects of finder’s share. A, Average proportion of scroungers (5SD) over the course of the day drawn against the finder’s share. Proportions
identified by “rate max.” were calculated by using Vickery et al.’s (1991) static model. B, Stable proportion of scrounger. C, Proportion of time
spent foraging along the day at various values of finder’s share.
decreasing FS (fig. 5). On the other hand, when food is
highly clumped, the probability of daily survival reaches
its maximum value at medium FS (fig. 5). Increasing the
amount of food per patch has similar consequences. For
small amounts of food the daily survival probability in-
creases steadily with the FS (i.e., birds enjoy the highest
survival when they do not share food with anyone; table
2). However, at large amounts of food per patch, inter-
mediate FS provides higher survival than larger FS (table
2). The differences between maximum daily survival and
daily survival with no food sharing ( ) may appearFS = 1.0
small, but these differences could accumulate to around
5% after 15 d.
Predation Hazard
Increasing predation hazard decreases the daily survival
for all values of FS. On the other hand, varying predation
hazard has no noticeable effect on either the average daily
proportion of scrounger (fig. 6A) or the daily scrounger
pattern, despite considerable variation in both the pro-
portion of individuals engaged in foraging and the level
of energy reserves (fig. 6B).
Recent studies (e.g., Ranta et al. 1998) hypothesize that
the use of a scrounger foraging strategy could allow a
player to detect an approaching predator sooner than if it
played producer. This means that the scrounger strategy
could provide its user with a lower predation hazard than
the producer strategy. The increased detection ability of
scrounging would be a by-product of having to survey the
vicinity in order to find successful producers. We model
this assumption by halving the predation hazard of in-
dividuals playing scrounger compared to those foraging as
producers. Then we double predation hazard of the whole
foraging group under this modified scenario to see whether
it has any effect on the stable proportion of foragers play-
ing scrounger. Reducing predation hazards of scrounging,
not too surprisingly, increases the stable proportion of the
scrounger strategy compared to the baseline case (fig. 6A).
However, doubling predation hazards for the whole group
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Figure 5: Probability of daily survival at different values of patchiness
as the function of the finder’s share. Patchiness was manipulated by
varying both the food finding rate (l) and amount of food in a patch
(Y ) so that their product remained constant. Increasing Y with decreasing
l means more aggregated food. Parameters are as baseline case except
for amount of food and patch finding rate.
Table 2: Probability of daily survival under different
values of finder’s share and amount of food (Y)
Finder’s
share Y = 10 Y = 20 Y = 50 Y = 100
.00 .2446 .8228 .9516 .9775
.05 2 .8788 .9637 .9837
.10 .7050 .9088 .9709 .9878
.15 .7766 .9266 .9754 .9901
.20 .8205 2 .9781 .9896
.25 .8510 .9449 .9815 .9903
.30 .8711 .9509 .9813 .9920
.35 .8858 .9562 .9812 .9936
.40 .8974 .9604 .9829 .9944
.45 .9067 .9638 .9870 .9958
.50 .9147 .9669 .9899 .9963a
.55 .9211 .9690 .9902 .9960
.60 .9263 .9724 .9890 .9960
.65 .9345 .9745 .9900 .9960
.70 .9416 .9760 .9907 .9960
.75 .9412 .9764a .9908a .9959
.80 .9396 .9760 .9907 .9959
.85 .9428 .9757 .9902 .9955
.90 .9441 2 .9896 .9957
.95 .9440 .9734 .9887 .9953
1.00 .9443a .9734 .9872 .9935
Note: The minus sign marks cells where stable solution
could not be reached with the baseline extent of error (d).
a Maximum survival probabilities for the given amount of
food.
had no further effect on the stable proportion of scroung-
ing (fig. 6A).
Discussion
Our state-dependent dynamic game model predicts (table
3) that the use of alternative foraging tactics, producer or
scrounger, should depend on both the time of day and
the animals’ energetic reserves. Specifically, early in the
day, low reserves promote a preference for the scrounger
strategy, while the same condition late in the day favors
the use of producer. As a consequence, individuals that
play scrounger are expected to be lighter early but heavier
late in the day than those opting to play producer. The
stable proportion of individuals playing scrounger is pre-
dicted to change along the day; it is the highest around
dawn and dusk and the lowest around midday. All of these
predictions are the consequences of the risk-sensitive prop-
erty of the foraging process; that is, the scrounger obtains
small amounts of food in a reliable way while the producer
can achieve either high or no food intake (fig. 1). Some
empirical evidence from earlier work is consistent with the
state-dependent dynamic model’s prediction. Koops and
Giraldeau (1996) report that food-deprived starlings first
increased their proportional use of scrounger early in the
day but then reduced it later in the day.
Around dawn in the winter, most birds have reserves
that have dropped close to 0 following a night of metabolic
expenditures without any feeding. So, at dawn, the birds
face a high likelihood of starvation. To avoid starvation
(i.e., letting reserves fall below the lower lethal boundary),
the birds need only a small amount of food, but they need
it reliably. Therefore, it is optimal with low reserves to
chose the risk-averse scrounger option that allows the an-
imals to gain some food almost certainly. In contrast to
the standard risk sensitivity models (McNamara and
Houston 1992b; McNamara 1996), however, the risk-
prone alternative (producer) is not eliminated from the
behavioral repertoire at this time of the day because it is
always advantageous to play producer when there are
many scroungers in the group. This, however, is only op-
timal at higher reserves because of the high variation in
producers’ food intake. As a consequence of this process
during early morning, one should observe many individ-
uals with low reserves playing scrounger and a few indi-
viduals with high reserves playing producer.
The situation changes during midday. It becomes worth
playing the risk-prone producer alternative more fre-
quently because the strategy allows animals to have a
higher chance of reaching high reserves and, therefore,
switch to resting in order to avoid predation. At the same
time, the punishment for preferring variation in food in-
take is low during this period of day because the animals
have had time to gain energy and so their reserves are
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Figure 6: Effects of changing predation hazard. Changes in (A) daily
average proportion of scroungers and (B) means of daily reserves with
finder’s share across different predation hazard. Predation hazard was
manipulated by shifting both the base predation hazard (when x = 0)
and the rate of increase. This way predation hazard was doubled or halved
at all values of state variable. Values of all other parameters are as in the
baseline case.
already far from the lower lethal boundary; that is, the
risk of starvation is much lower.
When dusk is approaching, it becomes important to
reach or to keep a critical level of reserves that would
insure overnight survival. Most of the animals following
the optimal policy throughout the day are likely to be close
to or at this required energy reserve. Therefore, most of
these animals need only a small but reliable amount of
food to reach or to maintain their critical reserve levels.
Consequently they play it safe by resorting more to the
scrounger strategy. However, those few individuals who
are still far from the critical overnight reserve level will
increase their chances of survival only by resorting more
to the risk-prone alternative and play producer, a predic-
tion that is in agreement with other risk-sensitivity models
(McNamara and Houston 1992b).
Previous studies (e.g., Giraldeau et al. 1990, 1994; Vick-
ery et al. 1991; Ranta et al. 1996) portrayed the presence
of the scrounger strategy within groups as an inevitable
cost of group living because scrounging decreases the mean
intake of food for all members of a foraging group. In a
stochastic, state-dependent, and dynamic world, however,
the availability of the scrounger strategy may, instead, be
seen as a benefit by providing an insurance against en-
ergetic shortfalls (Caraco and Giraldeau 1991; Koops and
Giraldeau 1996). Our model supports this view that the
availability of scrounging can be profitable because, as-
suming patches contain enough food, an individual’s
probability of daily survival was higher under conditions
when the scrounger tactic was available (i.e., at medium
values of FS) compared to cases where food sharing, and
hence the scrounger strategy, was impossible ( ).FS = 1.0
This insurance provided by the scrounger strategy may
explain why our model predicts more scroungers for high
values of FS than previous models (e.g., Vickery et al. 1991)
did. Note that we consider FS in our model as an inevitable
constraint over which individuals have no control. If in-
dividuals can alter FS (e.g., through dominance relation-
ships) things may change because a producer’s interest
may be to consume all of the patch alone (i.e., )FS = 1.0
while scroungers would find it more profitable to share
the whole patch ( ).FS = 0.0
Scrounging can be called a risk-averse tactic in the sense
that it decreases the chance of obtaining no food (fig. 1).
As a consequence, one may expect that the availability of
scrounging, that is, low FS, should increase individuals’
probability of survival under all circumstances. Why does
this only happen when food occurs in rare and/or rich
patches? The explanation is that, while it is true that the
scrounger strategy decreases the chance of finding no food
(note, this effect is greater if food patches are rare), this
outcome is counteracted by the consequent sharing with
others. Sharing food decreases an individual’s food intake
so that the scrounger can only increase survival probability
if the patches contain enough food to compensate for the
loss through sharing.
Severe winter conditions are thought to be one of the
main contributors to mortality in small passerine birds
(McNamara and Houston 1987). Therefore, the increased
survival probability provided by the scrounger alternative
may have a great effect on a population’s stability. It is
surprising, however, that changes in predation hazard had
no marked influence on the use of producer or scrounger
strategies although, as hypothesized by Ranta et al. (1998),
allowing the scrounger strategy to detect earlier the ap-
proaching predators does indeed lead to higher equilib-
rium proportions of scroungers within foraging groups.
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Table 3: Main testable predictions of the model
Definition
Prediction 1 Stable proportion of scrounger changes along the day:
Maximum proportion of scrounger around dawn and dusk;
Minimum proportion of scrounger around midday.
Prediction 2 Scroungers are lighter than producers during the first part of the day
but heavier later on.
Prediction 3 Varying predation hazard does not change stable proportion of scrounger.
Whether the use of scrounging is compatible with predator
detection, however, still needs to be addressed empirically.
An important feature of foraging groups, the dominance
hierarchy, is still missing from our model. The effect of
dominance hierarchy in a state-dependent dynamic world
may be not so straightforward, but we can speculate on
the basis of previous models. A recent static asymmetric
producer-scrounger model that includes a social domi-
nance hierarchy predicts that dominant individuals should
prefer the scrounger strategy more than the subordinates
(Barta and Giraldeau 1998). On the other hand, Clark and
Ekman’s (1995) state-dependent dynamic model predicts
that dominants keep their reserves at a lower level than
the subordinates. Combining these predictions with our
own does not alter the predicted pattern very much be-
cause we predict that individuals with low reserves will
use scrounger strategies more and that these will be the
dominants who should keep low reserves and prefer the
use of scrounging anyway. Empirical findings support
these predictions (Baker et al. 1981; Rohwer and Ewald
1981; Czikeli 1983; Theimer 1987; Caraco et al. 1989; Clif-
ton 1991). It would still be important, however, to distin-
guish the effects of dominance hierarchy from those of
energetic state. To this end, future work should consider
developing a state-dependent dynamic game model that
includes dominance hierarchy.
In the current state-dependent dynamic model, we con-
sidered FS as a constraint: a parameter that individuals
could not change. This approach, however, ignores the
possibility that individuals could control FS by choosing
to forage alone and hence to share food with no one.
Individuals may choose to forage alone when food sharing
does not provide an option that increases their survival
probability. Our model identifies the conditions under
which this would be the case as the availability of evenly
distributed patches, each offering only small amounts of
food. This argument is, of course, based on the assumption
that the foraging gains from resorting to solitary foraging
are sufficient to compensate the loss of safety from pred-
ators, which is seen as one of the major benefits of group
living (Hamilton 1971; Caraco and Pulliam 1984; Clark
and Mangel 1986; Elgar 1989; Sze´kely et al. 1989, 1991).
Our model, including modifications such as the explicit
modeling of predator attacks on foraging individuals (see,
e.g., McNamara and Houston 1992b for details), could
cope with the decision of foraging alone versus within a
group because it uses a common currency, daily survival,
to compare the value of different behavioral actions. Such
a future development could explicitly take into account
the changes in predation hazard caused by switching from
group to solitary foraging and by doing so would help
integrate questions of group size and the use of scrounging
that have to date remained distinct research traditions
within social foraging.
To summarize, our state-dependent dynamic producer-
scrounger game provides testable predictions (table 3)
about how time of day and animals’ energetic reserves
affect social foraging decisions. It further supports the
counterintuitive argument that the availability of a
scrounger foraging strategy can improve the daily survival
of any average group member despite its selfish exploitative
features. The model also indicates that more empirical
work is needed to clarify the role of predator detection in
this foraging context. Moreover, the model’s development
identified two important areas of future theoretical work:
including the effect of dominance hierarchy and investi-
gating the decision between foraging alone or in a group
of exploiters.
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APPENDIX
Model Specification
Time and Actions
We considered the birds’ behavior during 5 d and nights.
Each day was divided into 30 time intervals; that is, t =
is dawn and is dusk. Length of nights is not0 t = 30
specified in the model. At times , 1, ..., 29, the birdt = 0
chooses an available action. During the day, it can either
rest, produce, or scrounge, while during the night it rests.
State Variable
The bird’s state on day n is given by , which is theX (t)n
energy reserves. This variable takes nonnegative integer
values. The bird dies if because of starvation. LetX (t) = 0n
the bird have reserves at time t. Suppose it finds Ei ≥ 1
energy of food and uses metabolic energy D between t and
. Define , where xmax ist 1 1 x = chop(i 1 E 2 D, 0, x )max
the upper limit of reserves (energy that would raise re-
serves above this is lost); (Clark and Mangelchop(y, a, b)
1988) is defined as
b if y 1 b
chop(y, a, b) = y if a ≤ y ≤ b .{
a if y ! a
Since energy reserves take integer values, we define [x]
to be the integer part of x and assume that reserves at
are [x] with probability and aret 1 1 [x] 1 1 2 x [x] 1
with probability (Houston and McNamara1 x 2 [x]
1988a).
Daylight Metabolism
A bird that has reserves i at time t and behaves according
to action a between t and expendst 1 1 D = d0 1a a
amount of energy during this time interval. Action2d2 ia
a can be either resting, producing, or scrounging.
Overnight Metabolism
For overnight metabolism, X (0) = max [0, X (30) 2n11 n
, where Dnight is a random variable that follows anD ]night
approximate normal distribution with mean mnight and
standard deviation jnight.
Foraging
A bird using foraging tactic f (producer or scrounger) finds
amount of food during a time interval. TheE = k Ff f f
amount of food a bird obtains from a discovered patch is
Ff , while kf is the number of discovered patches between
t and . The number of discovered patches kf followst 1 1
a Poisson distribution with lf . A producer obtains F =P
amount of food from a patch, while aa 1 (Y 2 a)/n
scrounger gets amount. All patches containF = (Y 2 a)/nS
Y amount of food, from which a (the finder’s advantage;
Vickery et al. 1991) is consumed by the patch-discoverer
producer alone while is shared equally among theY 2 a
producer and the arriving scroungers (i.e., ).n = 1 1 NS
Finder’s share is defined as . Producers findFS = a/Y
patches with rate lP, while producer-monitoring scroung-
ers find them with (Clark and Mangell = l N[1 2 p (t)]S P S
1986), where N is the size of the foraging group and pS(t)
is the proportion of scroungers at time t.
Predation Hazard
Resting birds both during night and day are safe from
predation. A foraging bird that has reserves i at t and use
tactic f is killed between t and by a predator witht 1 1
probability .2m = m0 1 m2 if f f
The Dynamic Programming Function
Birds receive the terminal reward if they surviveR(x) = 1
the fifth night (i.e., ), otherwise they receiveX (0) 1 06
. The optimal policy that maximizes expected re-R(0) = 0
ward is found by dynamic programming extended by the
“errors in decision making” approach (Houston and Mc-
Namara 1987, 1988a; McNamara et al. 1997). First, we
assume that the population follows an arbitrary policy,
and so pS(t) is an arbitrary function of t. Given this con-
dition, the best response of a mutant can be determined
by backward induction. A mutant that is in state y at time
and follows the optimal policy from time on-t 1 1 t 1 1
ward has the reproductive value ;W(y, t 1 1) W(y, T) =
. Let be the mutant’s reproductive value givenR(y) W (x, t)a
that the mutant has reserves x at time t and it chooses
action a at t and then follows the optimal policy from
onward. The reproductive value for a resting mutantt 1 1
is , while, for a mutantW (x, t) = W[max (x 2 D , 0), t 1 1]r r
foraging with tactic f, it is
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(f )W (x, t) = (1 2 m ) p W[chop(x 2 DOf f k f
k=0
1 E , 0, x ), t 1 1].f max
The probability of finding , 1, ... food patches be-k = 0
tween t and according to a Poisson distribution witht 1 1
parameter lf is
kl f(f )p = exp (2l ) .k f k!
Because of minimizing computational effort, the sum over
k ran until either or , whichever(f ) 25k = 50 1 2 Sp ! 10k
occurred first. In both cases, was normalized to sum(f )Spk
up to 1. Days were linked by the approximation of the
equation
W (x, T) = W (x 2 y, 0)f(y)dy,n E n11
where is the density function for Dnight.f(y)
From the reproductive values for each action ,W (x, t)a
one can determine . To calculate , we followW(x, t) W(x, t)
McNamara et al.’s (1997) “errors in decision making” ap-
proach throughout. First, we calculate the cost of choosing
an action
C (x, t) = max [W (x, t)] 2 W (x, t),a a a
then assign a weight to each action a
B (x, t) = H [C (x, t)],a d a
using the error function . After havingH (u) = exp (2u/d)d
the weights, we calculate the probability that action a will
be chosen by the mutant . Thesep (x, t) = B (x, t)/SB (x, t)a a a
probabilities give the optimal policy at x, t. Having the
optimal policy, we calculate . Af-W(x, t) = Sp (x, t)W (x, t)a a
ter calculating , the whole procedure can be re-W(x, t)
peated to determine until , and so theW(x, t 2 1) t = 0
mutant’s optimal policy can be determined for the entire
period.
After calculating the mutant optimal policy, we replace
the resident policy partly by the new mutant policy then
calculate the distribution of reserves along the days with
this new policy by the standard forward iteration technique
(Mangel and Clark 1988; McNamara and Houston 1990).
The extent of replacement was given by the replacement
factor , and the new policy was deter-N(rf = 0.2) p (x, t)a
mined as whereN ′p (x, t) = (1 2 rf)p (x, t) 1 rfp (x, t)a a a
is the resident policy. In the forward iteration, we′p (x, t)
used the policies derived by the backward induction for
the first day to insure independence on terminal condition.
Having the distribution of reserves and the optimal policy,
we calculate the new proportion of scroungers, pS(t), and
then repeat the whole cycle of backward induction and
forward iteration again. In backward induction, we used
the proportion of scroungers calculated by forward iter-
ation for the fifth day to eliminate dependencies on initial
reserve distribution. The repetition of backward induction
and forward iteration continued either until 5,000 repe-
titions or until the average difference between the mutant
and the resident policy decreased below 0.00001, which-
ever occurred first. The reached policy, however, was con-
sider as evolutionarily stable dynamic policy only in the
second case. The difference between policies was calculated
as
′ 2( )O [p (x, t) 2 p x, t ]Î a a
a
and was averaged across all values of x and t. The optimal
policy of the previous repetition is . The source code′p (x, t)a
of the model is available from the authors upon request.
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